## Summary
I noticed that the pipeline can succeed if there are problems with tool
installation or dependency resolution. This change makes sure that the
pipeline fails in these cases.
## Summary
Add a new pipeline to comment on PRs if there is a mypy_primer diff
result.
## Test Plan
Not yet, I'm afraid I will have to merge this first to have the pipeline
available on main.
Regardless of whether #16408 and #16311 pan out, this part is worth
pulling out as a separate PR.
Before, you had to define a new `IndexVec` index type for each type of
association list you wanted to create. Now there's a single index type
that's internal to the alist implementation, and you use `List<K, V>` to
store a handle to a particular list.
This also adds some property tests for the alist implementation.
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Type | Update | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
|
[cloudflare/wrangler-action](https://redirect.github.com/cloudflare/wrangler-action)
| action | minor | `v3.13.1` -> `v3.14.0` |
---
> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency
Dashboard for more information.
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>cloudflare/wrangler-action
(cloudflare/wrangler-action)</summary>
###
[`v3.14.0`](https://redirect.github.com/cloudflare/wrangler-action/releases/tag/v3.14.0)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/cloudflare/wrangler-action/compare/v3.13.1...v3.14.0)
##### Minor Changes
-
[#​351](https://redirect.github.com/cloudflare/wrangler-action/pull/351)
[`4ff07f4`](4ff07f4310)
Thanks [@​Maximo-Guk](https://redirect.github.com/Maximo-Guk)! -
Use wrangler outputs for version upload and wrangler deploy
##### Patch Changes
-
[#​350](https://redirect.github.com/cloudflare/wrangler-action/pull/350)
[`e209094`](e209094e62)
Thanks [@​Maximo-Guk](https://redirect.github.com/Maximo-Guk)! -
Handle failures in createGitHubDeployment and createGitHubJobSummary
</details>
---
### Configuration
📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "before 4am on Monday" (UTC),
Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you
are satisfied.
♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.
---
- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box
---
This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/astral-sh/ruff).
<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzOS4xNjcuMSIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjM5LjE2Ny4xIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJpbnRlcm5hbCJdfQ==-->
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
Revert the v4 update for now until the codebase is updated
(https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff/pull/16069).
Update renovate config to disable updating it.
## Test Plan
```console
$ npx --yes --package renovate -- renovate-config-validator
(node:98977) [DEP0040] DeprecationWarning: The `punycode` module is deprecated. Please use a userland alternative instead.
(Use `node --trace-deprecation ...` to show where the warning was created)
INFO: Validating .github/renovate.json5
INFO: Config validated successfully
```
And run `npm run build` in the `playground/` directory.
This PR replaces most of the hard-coded AST definitions with a
generation script, similar to what happens in `rust_python_formatter`.
I've replaced every "rote" definition that I could find, where the
content is entirely boilerplate and only depends on what syntax nodes
there are and which groups they belong to.
This is a pretty massive diff, but it's entirely a refactoring. It
should make absolutely no changes to the API or implementation. In
particular, this required adding some configuration knobs that let us
override default auto-generated names where they don't line up with
types that we created previously by hand.
## Test plan
There should be no changes outside of the `rust_python_ast` crate, which
verifies that there were no API changes as a result of the
auto-generation. Aggressive `cargo clippy` and `uvx pre-commit` runs
after each commit in the branch.
---------
Co-authored-by: Micha Reiser <micha@reiser.io>
Co-authored-by: Alex Waygood <Alex.Waygood@Gmail.com>
## Summary
The symlink-approach in the typeshed-sync workflow caused some problems
on Windows, even though it seemed to work fine in CI:
https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff/pull/15138#issuecomment-2578642129
Here, we rely on `build.rs` to patch typeshed instead, which allows us
to get rid of the modifications in the workflow (thank you
@MichaReiser for the idea).
## Test Plan
- Made sure that changes to `knot_extensions.pyi` result in a recompile
of `red_knot_vendored`.
## Summary
- Add a workflow to run property tests on a daily basis (based on
`daily_fuzz.yaml`)
- Mark `assignable_to_is_reflexive` as flaky (related to #14899)
- Add new (failing) `intersection_assignable_to_both` test (also related
to #14899)
## Test Plan
Ran:
```bash
export QUICKCHECK_TESTS=100000
while cargo test --release -p red_knot_python_semantic -- \
--ignored types::property_tests::stable; do :; done
```
Observed successful property_tests CI run
## Summary
Adds a type-check-time Python API that allows us to create and
manipulate types and to test various of their properties. For example,
this can be used to write a Markdown test to make sure that `A & B` is a
subtype of `A` and `B`, but not of an unrelated class `C` (something
that requires quite a bit more code to do in Rust):
```py
from knot_extensions import Intersection, is_subtype_of, static_assert
class A: ...
class B: ...
type AB = Intersection[A, B]
static_assert(is_subtype_of(AB, A))
static_assert(is_subtype_of(AB, B))
class C: ...
static_assert(not is_subtype_of(AB, C))
```
I think this functionality is also helpful for interactive debugging
sessions, in order to query various properties of Red Knot's type
system. Which is something that otherwise requires a custom Rust unit
test, some boilerplate code and constant re-compilation.
## Test Plan
- New Markdown tests
- Tested the modified typeshed_sync workflow locally
## Summary
This PR upgrades zizmor to the latest release in our CI. zizmor is a
static analyzer checking for security issues in GitHub workflows. The
new release finds some new issues in our workflows; this PR fixes some
of the issues, and adds ignores for some other issues.
The issues fixed in this PR are new cases of zizmor's
[`template-injection`](https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#template-injection)
rule being emitted. The issues I'm ignoring for now are all to do with
the
[`cache-poisoning`](https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#cache-poisoning)
rule. The main reason I'm fixing some but ignoring others is that I'm
confident fixing the template-injection diagnostics won't have any
impact on how our workflows operate in CI, but I'm worried that fixing
the cache-poisoning diagnostics could slow down our CI a fair bit. I
don't mind if somebody else is motivated to try to fix these
diagnostics, but for now I think I'd prefer to just ignore them; it
doesn't seem high-priority enough to try to fix them right now :-)
## Test Plan
- `uvx pre-commit run -a --hook-stage=manual` passes locally
- Let's see if CI passes on this PR...
## Summary
This PR changes our zizmor configuration to also flag low-severity
security issues in our GitHub Actions workflows. It's a followup to
https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff/pull/14844. The issues being fixed
here were all flagged by [zizmor's `template-injection`
rule](https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#template-injection):
> Detects potential sources of code injection via template expansion.
>
> GitHub Actions allows workflows to define template expansions, which
occur within special `${{ ... }}` delimiters. These expansions happen
before workflow and job execution, meaning the expansion of a given
expression appears verbatim in whatever context it was performed in.
>
> Template expansions aren't syntax-aware, meaning that they can result
in unintended shell injection vectors. This is especially true when
they're used with attacker-controllable expression contexts, such as
`github.event.issue.title` (which the attacker can fully control by
supplying a new issue title).
[...]
> To fully remediate the vulnerability, you should not use `${{
env.VARNAME }}`, since that is still a template expansion. Instead, you
should use `${VARNAME}` to ensure that the shell itself performs the
variable expansion.
## Test Plan
I tested that this passes all zizmore warnings by running `pre-commit
run -a zizmor` locally. The other test is obviously to check that the
workflows all still run correctly in CI 😄
## Summary
A [recent exploit](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc)
brought attention to how easy it can be for attackers to use template
expansion in GitHub Actions workflows to inject arbitrary code into a
repository. That vulnerability [would have been caught by the zizmor
linter](https://blog.yossarian.net/2024/12/06/zizmor-ultralytics-injection),
which looks for potential security vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions
workflows. This PR adds [zizmor](https://github.com/woodruffw/zizmor) as
a pre-commit hook and fixes the high- and medium-severity warnings
flagged by the tool.
All the warnings fixed in this PR are related to this zizmor check:
https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#artipacked. The summary of
the check is that `actions/checkout` will by default persist git
configuration for the duration of the workflow, which can be insecure.
It's unnecessary unless you actually need to do things with `git` later
on in the workflow. None of our workflows do except for
`publish-docs.yml` and `sync-typeshed.yml`, so I set
`persist-credentials: true` for those two but `persist-credentials:
false` for all other uses of `actions/checkout`.
Unfortunately there are several warnings in `release.yml`, including
four high-severity warnings. However, this is a generated workflow file,
so I have deliberately excluded this file from the check. These are the
findings in `release.yml`:
<details>
<summary>release.yml findings</summary>
```
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:62:9
|
62 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
63 | | with:
64 | | submodules: recursive
| |_______________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:124:9
|
124 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
125 | | with:
126 | | submodules: recursive
| |_______________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:174:9
|
174 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
175 | | with:
176 | | submodules: recursive
| |_______________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:249:9
|
249 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
250 | | with:
251 | | submodules: recursive
252 | | # Create a GitHub Release while uploading all files to it
| |_______________________________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
error[excessive-permissions]: overly broad workflow or job-level permissions
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:17:1
|
17 | / permissions:
18 | | "contents": "write"
... |
39 | | # If there's a prerelease-style suffix to the version, then the release(s)
40 | | # will be marked as a prerelease.
| |_________________________________^ contents: write is overly broad at the workflow level
|
= note: audit confidence → High
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:80:9
|
80 | - id: plan
| _________^
81 | | run: |
| |_________^
82 | || dist ${{ (inputs.tag && inputs.tag != 'dry-run' && format('host --steps=create --tag={0}', inputs.tag)) || 'plan' }} --out...
83 | || echo "dist ran successfully"
84 | || cat plan-dist-manifest.json
85 | || echo "manifest=$(jq -c "." plan-dist-manifest.json)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ this step
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ inputs.tag may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:80:9
|
80 | - id: plan
| _________^
81 | | run: |
| |_________^
82 | || dist ${{ (inputs.tag && inputs.tag != 'dry-run' && format('host --steps=create --tag={0}', inputs.tag)) || 'plan' }} --out...
83 | || echo "dist ran successfully"
84 | || cat plan-dist-manifest.json
85 | || echo "manifest=$(jq -c "." plan-dist-manifest.json)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ this step
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ inputs.tag may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:80:9
|
80 | - id: plan
| _________^
81 | | run: |
| |_________^
82 | || dist ${{ (inputs.tag && inputs.tag != 'dry-run' && format('host --steps=create --tag={0}', inputs.tag)) || 'plan' }} --out...
83 | || echo "dist ran successfully"
84 | || cat plan-dist-manifest.json
85 | || echo "manifest=$(jq -c "." plan-dist-manifest.json)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ this step
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ inputs.tag may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
```
</details>
## Test Plan
`uvx pre-commit run -a`
## Summary
This PR adds a fuzzer harness for red knot that runs the type checker on
source code that contains invalid syntax.
Additionally, this PR also updates the `init-fuzzer.sh` script to
increase the corpus size to:
* Include various crates that includes Python source code
* Use the 3.13 CPython source code
And, remove any non-Python files from the final corpus so that when the
fuzzer tries to minify the corpus, it doesn't produce files that only
contains documentation content as that's just noise.
## Test Plan
Run `./fuzz/init-fuzzer.sh`, say no to the large dataset.
Run the fuzzer with `cargo +night fuzz run red_knot_check_invalid_syntax
-- -timeout=5`
## Summary
Make sure we run the tests for mdtest-only changes.
## Test Plan
Tested if positive glob patterns override negative patterns here:
https://codepen.io/mrmlnc/pen/OXQjMe
David Peter
Micha Reiser
Douglas Creager
Zanie Blue
Brent Westbrook
renovate[bot]
Shaygan Hooshyari
Dhruv Manilawala
Dylan
Alex Waygood
InSync
Andrew Gallant