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Minor touchups to the Docker provenance docs (#11252)

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Zanie Blue 2025-02-05 11:09:15 -06:00 committed by GitHub
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docs/guides/integration/docker.md
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@ -503,13 +503,15 @@ RUN uv pip install -e .
## Verifying image provenance ## Verifying image provenance
The docker images are signed during the build process to provide proof of their origin, and you can The Docker images are signed during the build process to provide proof of their origin. These
verify these attestations that a given image was produced by the uv project with the attestations can be used to verify that an image was produced from an official channel.
[GitHub cli tool `gh`](https://cli.github.com/):
For example, you can verify the attestations with the
[GitHub CLI tool `gh`](https://cli.github.com/):
```console ```console
$ gh attestation verify --owner astral-sh oci://ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest $ gh attestation verify --owner astral-sh oci://ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest
Loaded digest sha256:5adf09a5a526f380237408032a9308000d14d5947eafa687ad6c6a2476787b4f for oci://ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest Loaded digest sha256:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx for oci://ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest
Loaded 1 attestation from GitHub API Loaded 1 attestation from GitHub API
The following policy criteria will be enforced: The following policy criteria will be enforced:
@ -520,7 +522,7 @@ The following policy criteria will be enforced:
✓ Verification succeeded! ✓ Verification succeeded!
sha256:5adf09a5a526f380237408032a9308000d14d5947eafa687ad6c6a2476787b4f was attested by: sha256:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx was attested by:
REPO PREDICATE_TYPE WORKFLOW REPO PREDICATE_TYPE WORKFLOW
astral-sh/uv https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 .github/workflows/build-docker.yml@refs/heads/main astral-sh/uv https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 .github/workflows/build-docker.yml@refs/heads/main
``` ```
@ -528,14 +530,6 @@ astral-sh/uv https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 .github/workflows/build-docker.yml
This tells you that the specific Docker image was built by the official uv Github release workflow This tells you that the specific Docker image was built by the official uv Github release workflow
and hasn't been tampered with since. and hasn't been tampered with since.
!!! tip
Attestations are provided for both the ditroless main image, and for the derived images.
You probably want to verify the attestation for a specific version tag, rather than `:latest`,
or even the specific image digest, such as
`ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.5.28@sha256:5adf09a5a526f380237408032a9308000d14d5947eafa687ad6c6a2476787b4f`.
GitHub attestations build on the [sigstore.dev infrastructure](https://www.sigstore.dev/). As such GitHub attestations build on the [sigstore.dev infrastructure](https://www.sigstore.dev/). As such
you can also use the [`cosign` command](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) to verify the you can also use the [`cosign` command](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) to verify the
attestation blob against the (multi-platform) manifest for `uv`: attestation blob against the (multi-platform) manifest for `uv`:
@ -543,10 +537,10 @@ attestation blob against the (multi-platform) manifest for `uv`:
```console ```console
$ REPO=astral-sh/uv $ REPO=astral-sh/uv
$ gh attestation download --repo $REPO oci://ghcr.io/${REPO}:latest $ gh attestation download --repo $REPO oci://ghcr.io/${REPO}:latest
Wrote attestations to file sha256:5adf09a5a526f380237408032a9308000d14d5947eafa687ad6c6a2476787b4f.jsonl. Wrote attestations to file sha256:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.jsonl.
Any previous content has been overwritten Any previous content has been overwritten
The trusted metadata is now available at sha256:5adf09a5a526f380237408032a9308000d14d5947eafa687ad6c6a2476787b4f.jsonl The trusted metadata is now available at sha256:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.jsonl
$ docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/${REPO}:latest --format "{{json .Manifest}}" > manifest.json $ docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/${REPO}:latest --format "{{json .Manifest}}" > manifest.json
$ cosign verify-blob-attestation \ $ cosign verify-blob-attestation \
--new-bundle-format \ --new-bundle-format \
@ -556,3 +550,9 @@ $ cosign verify-blob-attestation \
<(jq -j '.|del(.digest,.size)' manifest.json) <(jq -j '.|del(.digest,.size)' manifest.json)
Verified OK Verified OK
``` ```
!!! tip
These examples use `latest`, but best practice is to verify the attestation for a specific
version tag, e.g., `ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.5.28`, or (even better) the specific image digest,
such as `ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.5.27@sha256:5adf09a5a526f380237408032a9308000d14d5947eafa687ad6c6a2476787b4f`.