## Summary
If `HF_TOKEN` is set, we'll automatically wire it up to authenticate
requests when hitting private `huggingface.co` URLs in `uv run`.
## Test Plan
An unauthenticated request:
```
> cargo run -- run https://huggingface.co/datasets/cmarsh/test/resolve/main/main.py
File "/var/folders/nt/6gf2v7_s3k13zq_t3944rwz40000gn/T/mainYadr5M.py", line 1
Invalid username or password.
^^^^^^^^
SyntaxError: invalid syntax
```
An authenticated request:
```
> HF_TOKEN=hf_... cargo run run https://huggingface.co/datasets/cmarsh/test/resolve/main/main.py
Hello from main.py!
```
Prior to this PR, there were numerous places where uv would leak
credentials in logs. We had a way to mask credentials by calling methods
or a recently-added `redact_url` function, but this was not secure by
default. There were a number of other types (like `GitUrl`) that would
leak credentials on display.
This PR adds a `DisplaySafeUrl` newtype to prevent leaking credentials
when logging by default. It takes a maximalist approach, replacing the
use of `Url` almost everywhere. This includes when first parsing config
files, when storing URLs in types like `GitUrl`, and also when storing
URLs in types that in practice will never contain credentials (like
`DirectorySourceUrl`). The idea is to make it easy for developers to do
the right thing and for the compiler to support this (and to minimize
ever having to manually convert back and forth). Displaying credentials
now requires an active step. Note that despite this maximalist approach,
the use of the newtype should be zero cost.
One conspicuous place this PR does not use `DisplaySafeUrl` is in the
`uv-auth` crate. That would require new clones since there are calls to
`request.url()` that return a `&Url`. One option would have been to make
`DisplaySafeUrl` wrap a `Cow`, but this would lead to lifetime
annotations all over the codebase. I've created a separate PR based on
this one (#13576) that updates `uv-auth` to use `DisplaySafeUrl` with
one new clone. We can discuss the tradeoffs there.
Most of this PR just replaces `Url` with `DisplaySafeUrl`. The core is
`uv_redacted/lib.rs`, where the newtype is implemented. To make it
easier to review the rest, here are some points of note:
* `DisplaySafeUrl` has a `Display` implementation that masks
credentials. Currently, it will still display the username when there is
both a username and password. If we think is the wrong choice, it can
now be changed in one place.
* `DisplaySafeUrl` has a `remove_credentials()` method and also a
`.to_string_with_credentials()` method. This allows us to use it in a
variety of scenarios.
* `IndexUrl::redacted()` was renamed to
`IndexUrl::removed_credentials()` to make it clearer that we are not
masking.
* We convert from a `DisplaySafeUrl` to a `Url` when calling `reqwest`
methods like `.get()` and `.head()`.
* We convert from a `DisplaySafeUrl` to a `Url` when creating a
`uv_auth::Index`. That is because, as mentioned above, I will be
updating the `uv_auth` crate to use this newtype in a separate PR.
* A number of tests (e.g., in `pip_install.rs`) that formerly used
filters to mask tokens in the test output no longer need those filters
since tokens in URLs are now masked automatically.
* The one place we are still knowingly writing credentials to
`pyproject.toml` is when a URL with credentials is passed to `uv add`
with `--raw`. Since displaying credentials is no longer automatic, I
have added a `to_string_with_credentials()` method to the `Pep508Url`
trait. This is used when `--raw` is passed. Adding it to that trait is a
bit weird, but it's the simplest way to achieve the goal. I'm open to
suggestions on how to improve this, but note that because of the way
we're using generic bounds, it's not as simple as just creating a
separate trait for that method.
Some registries (like Azure Artifact) can require you to authenticate
separately for every package URL if you do not authenticate for the
/simple endpoint. These changes make the auth middleware aware of index
URL endpoints and attempts to fetch keyring credentials for such an
index URL when making a request to any URL it's a prefix of.
The current uv behavior is to cache credentials either at the request
URL or realm level. But with these changes, we also need to cache
credentials at the index level. Note that when uv does not detect an
index URL for a request URL, it will continue to apply the old behavior.
Addresses part of #4056Closes#4583Closes#11236Closes#11391Closes#11507
Adds a new optional key `auth-policy` to `[tool.uv.index]` that sets the
authentication policy for the index URL.
The default is `"auto"`, which attempts to authenticate when necessary.
`"always"` always attempts to authenticate and fails if the endpoint is
unauthenticated. `"never"` never attempts to authenticate.
These policy address two kinds of cases:
* Some indexes don’t fail on unauthenticated requests; instead they just
forward to the public PyPI. This can leave the user confused as to why
their package is missing. The "always" policy prevents this.
* "never" allows users to ensure their credentials couldn't be leaked to
an unexpected index, though it will only allow for successful requests
on an index that doesn't require credentials.
Closes#11600
## Summary
This PR enables users to provide index credentials via named environment
variables.
For example, given an index named `internal` that requires a username
(`public`) and password
(`koala`), you can define the index (without credentials) in your
`pyproject.toml`:
```toml
[[tool.uv.index]]
name = "internal"
url = "https://pypi-proxy.corp.dev/simple"
```
Then set the `UV_INDEX_INTERNAL_USERNAME` and
`UV_INDEX_INTERNAL_PASSWORD`
environment variables, where `INTERNAL` is the uppercase version of the
index name:
```sh
export UV_INDEX_INTERNAL_USERNAME=public
export UV_INDEX_INTERNAL_PASSWORD=koala
```
## Summary
We retain them if you use `--raw-sources`, but otherwise they're
removed. We still respect them in the subsequent `uv.lock` via an
in-process store.
Closes#6056.
In #2976 I made some changes that led to regressions:
- We stopped tracking URLs that we had not seen credentials for in the
cache
- This means the cache no longer returns a value to indicate we've seen
a realm before
- We stopped seeding the cache with URLs
- Combined with the above, this means we no longer had a list of
locations that we would never attempt to fetch credentials for
- We added caching of credentials found on requests
- Previously the cache was only populated from the seed or credentials
found in the netrc or keyring
- This meant that the cache was populated for locations that we
previously did not cache, i.e. GitHub artifacts(?)
Unfortunately this unveiled problems with the granularity of our cache.
We cache credentials per realm (roughly the hostname) but some realms
have mixed authentication modes i.e. different credentials per URL or
URLs that do not require credentials. Applying credentials to a URL that
does not require it can lead to a failed request, as seen in #3123 where
GitHub throws a 401 when receiving credentials.
To resolve this, the cache is expanded to supporting caching at two
levels:
- URL, cached URL must be a prefix of the request URL
- Realm, exact match required
When we don't have URL-level credentials cached, we attempt the request
without authentication first. On failure, we'll search for realm-level
credentials or fetch credentials from external services. This avoids
providing credentials to new URLs unless we know we need them.
Closes https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/3123
<!--
Thank you for contributing to uv! To help us out with reviewing, please
consider the following:
- Does this pull request include a summary of the change? (See below.)
- Does this pull request include a descriptive title?
- Does this pull request include references to any relevant issues?
-->
## Summary
<!-- What's the purpose of the change? What does it do, and why? -->
Adds basic keyring auth support for `uv` commands. Adds clone of `pip`'s
`--keyring-provider subprocess` argument (using CLI `keyring` tool).
See issue: https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/1520
## Test Plan
<!-- How was it tested? -->
Hard to write full-suite unit tests due to reliance on
`process::Command` for `keyring` cli
Manually tested end-to-end in a project with GCP artifact registry using
keyring password:
```bash
➜ uv pip uninstall watchdog
Uninstalled 1 package in 46ms
- watchdog==4.0.0
➜ cargo run -- pip install --index-url https://<redacted>/python/simple/ --extra-index-url https://<redacted>/pypi-mirror/simple/ watchdog
Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.18s
Running `target/debug/uv pip install --index-url 'https://<redacted>/python/simple/' --extra-index-url 'https://<redacted>/pypi-mirror/simple/' watchdog`
error: HTTP status client error (401 Unauthorized) for url (https://<redacted>/pypi-mirror/simple/watchdog/)
➜ cargo run -- pip install --keyring-provider subprocess --index-url https://<redacted>/python/simple/ --extra-index-url https://<redacted>/pypi-mirror/simple/ watchdog
Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.17s
Running `target/debug/uv pip install --keyring-provider subprocess --index-url 'https://<redacted>/python/simple/' --extra-index-url 'https://<redacted>/pypi-mirror/simple/' watchdog`
Resolved 1 package in 2.34s
Installed 1 package in 27ms
+ watchdog==4.0.0
```
`requirements.txt`
```
#
# This file is autogenerated by pip-compile with Python 3.10
# by the following command:
#
# .bin/generate-requirements
#
--index-url https://<redacted>/python/simple/
--extra-index-url https://<redacted>/pypi-mirror/simple/
...
```
```bash
➜ cargo run -- pip install --keyring-provider subprocess -r requirements.txt
Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.19s
Running `target/debug/uv pip install --keyring-provider subprocess -r requirements.txt`
Resolved 205 packages in 23.52s
Built <redacted>
...
Downloaded 47 packages in 19.32s
Installed 195 packages in 276ms
+ <redacted>
...
```
---------
Co-authored-by: Thomas Gilgenast <thomas@vant.ai>
Co-authored-by: Zanie Blue <contact@zanie.dev>
Address a few pedantic lints
lints are separated into separate commits so they can be reviewed
individually.
I've not added enforcement for any of these lints, but that could be
added if desirable.
Closes https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/1709
Closes https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/1371
Tested with the reproduction provided in #1709 which gets past the HTTP
401.
Reuses the same copying logic we introduced in
https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/pull/1874 to ensure authentication is
attached to file URLs with a realm that matches that of the index. I had
to move the authentication logic into a new crate so it could be used in
`distribution-types`.
We will want to something more robust in the future, like track all
realms with authentication in a central store and perform lookups there.
That's what `pip` does and it allows consolidation of logic like netrc
lookups. That refactor feels significant though, and I'd like to get
this fixed ASAP so this is a minimal fix.