FOUND BY ACCIDENT, WHICH IS THE POINT. `grep -rn func_8013C08C src/` returned NOTHING for
a function that is defined right there. The file held a RAW NUL byte inside a character
literal — the source read `== '<NUL>'` where it should read `== '\0'`. It COMPILES (the
fleet was byte-identical), so no byte-gate ever objected. But file(1) classifies such a
file as `data`, and **grep treats a file containing NUL as BINARY and reports nothing,
silently**. The whole file therefore vanished from every grep-based audit and every hand
search. I burned real time chasing a phantom missing function before `file` gave it away.
SCOPE, measured: 137 files — every `_o0c`/`_o0e` region created in THIS session. The
templated bodies carried the NUL fleet-wide, so I propagated the defect today. All fixed
(`'<NUL>'` -> `'\0'`); R22 CLEAN-FLEET 140 passed, 0 failed of 140 => byte-neutral.
NEW ORACLE: tools/audit_text_sources.py + `make audit-text-sources`, wired into
tools-health, coverage-asserting over all 3,887 tracked .c/.h files (R32). This is the
SAME silent-skip family as SS124 (a scanner that cannot see something reports it is not
there) and SS126a (a bare except swallowing a coverage assertion) — but one layer LOWER,
in the tool everyone reaches for first. The byte-gate is structurally blind to it (R34):
the bytes are correct, so it has nothing to say. It needs its own oracle.
MY OWN ERROR, RECORDED: proving the new guard fires, I injected a NUL into the REAL tracked
file and restored it through nested shell escaping. The restore left `'\\0'` — an escaped
backslash, i.e. a multi-character constant, NOT a NUL — a genuine semantic change. R22 caught
it (139/140) in one cycle, before any commit; repaired to `'\0'` (10465 -> 10466 bytes) and
re-verified 140/140. The lesson is not "be careful": a negative control must corrupt a SCRATCH
COPY under .run/, never the tracked file it is testing. Testing a guard must not risk
introducing the defect the guard exists to catch.
Drew T