Files
jak-project/third-party/curl/tests/unit/unit1655.c
Alexander J. Semenuk 5d5e35fb9b fix: Windows toolchain compatibility (curl 8.21 re-vendor, endless reconfigure loop) (#4355)
## Problem

Windows builds break with a current local toolchain (Scoop LLVM 22.1.8,
CMake 4.4.0, VS 2026), in two independent ways:

1. The build stops at curl's deliberate guard: `#error "no non-blocking
method was found/used/set"` in `third-party/curl/lib/nonblock.c`.
2. From the second configure onward, `cmake --build` re-runs CMake in an
endless loop (observed 42 consecutive reconfigure cycles in a single
build). Likely the same mechanism behind the "endlessly building" VS
2026 note in `docs/setup/dev/vs.md`.

## Root cause

1. `third-party/curl/CMake/CurlTests.c` passes `int *` to
`ioctlsocket()`, whose third parameter is `u_long *`. Clang 22 promotes
`-Wincompatible-pointer-types` to a hard error in C, so the
`HAVE_IOCTLSOCKET_FIONBIO` try_compile silently fails and
`curl_config.h` never defines it. Upstream CI does not see this because
the windows-2022 runner image ships an older LLVM. GCC 14 promotes the
same warning to a hard error, which is very likely the `CurlTests.c.obj`
failure reported from MSYS2 in open-goal/jak-project#3551. Upstream curl
hit the identical problem with GCC 14 and fixed the probe in curl 8.8.0
(curl/curl#13578).
2. The root CMakeLists copies the build tree's `compile_commands.json`
into `<src>/build/` for clangd using `configure_file()`, which registers
its input as a configure dependency. CMake rewrites
`compile_commands.json` late in every generation, after
`CTestTestfile.cmake` and `cmake_install.cmake` (outputs of the same
Ninja regen rule), so once the dependency is registered the rule is
deterministically dirty and every `ninja` invocation re-runs CMake. A
pristine first configure is safe (the file does not exist yet, so the
`if(EXISTS ...)` guard skips the copy), which is why the loop looks
machine- or IDE-specific.

## Fix

1. Per review, re-vendor `third-party/curl` at the `curl-8_21_0` tag
(previously `curl-8_3_0`), which carries the upstream probe fix plus two
years of upstream development; `vendor.yaml` updated to match.
Adjustments the version jump forced:
- curl 8.15 removed the native macOS Secure Transport backend
(`CURL_USE_SECTRANSP`), so macOS now builds curl against OpenSSL like
Linux. The two macOS workflows install Homebrew `openssl@3` and export
`OPENSSL_ROOT_DIR` (keg-only), and the macOS setup docs gained the same
two lines.
- `CURL_BROTLI` / `CURL_ZSTD` switched to AUTO-detection in curl 8.10;
pinned OFF to keep the previous no-compression behavior and avoid
silently linking whatever the CI images happen to have.
- curl's new top-level `BUILD_EXAMPLES` cache option (default ON) leaked
into discord-rpc's identically named option and broke configure at a
nonexistent `examples/send-presence` directory; pinned OFF ahead of the
third-party subdirectories.

The diff is dominated by the mechanical tag-tree swap under
`third-party/curl` (linguist-vendored, collapsed in review). The
hand-written changes are `CMakeLists.txt`, the two macOS workflows,
`docs/setup/system/macos.md`, and `vendor.yaml`.
2. Swap `configure_file()` for `file(COPY ...)`: the same clangd copy
with no configure dependency registered. (`file(COPY_FILE ...
ONLY_IF_DIFFERENT)` would be cleaner still but requires CMake 3.21,
above the declared `cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.10)`.)

## Test plan

- [x] Fresh `cmake --preset Release-windows-clang` (LLVM 22, no cache
seeding) completes and logs `Enabled SSL backends: Schannel`; the
FIONBIO probe passes without the previous `#error`
- [x] Full Windows Release build from scratch in the branch worktree
(all 1422 targets)
- [x] goalc-test suite: 1509 passed, 0 failed
- [x] Second consecutive configure with `compile_commands.json` present:
the regen rule in `build.ninja` has no `compile_commands.json` input;
`<src>/build/compile_commands.json` is still refreshed for clangd
- [x] Repeated `ninja` invocations after a full build no longer re-run
CMake
- [x] macOS Intel and ARM CI green (first exercise of the OpenSSL
backend switch)

---

I work off a self-hosted forge, so this GitHub account is quiet; the
configure logs and ninja dirty-node traces from the investigation are
available if anyone wants the raw data.

(AI-assisted)
2026-07-27 19:19:18 -04:00

175 lines
6.9 KiB
C
Vendored
Generated

/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
*
***************************************************************************/
#include "unitcheck.h"
#include "doh.h"
static CURLcode test_unit1655(const char *arg)
{
UNITTEST_BEGIN_SIMPLE
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH
/*
* Prove detection of write overflow using a short buffer and a name
* of maximal valid length.
*
* Prove detection of other invalid input.
*/
do {
static const char max[] =
/* ..|....1.........2.........3.........4.........5.........6... */
/* 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 */
"this.is.a.maximum-length.hostname." /* 34: 34 */
"with-no-label-of-greater-length-than-the-sixty-three-characters."
/* 64: 98 */
"specified.in.the.RFCs." /* 22: 120 */
"and.with.a.QNAME.encoding.whose.length.is.exactly." /* 50: 170 */
"the.maximum.length.allowed." /* 27: 197 */
"that.is.two-hundred.and.fifty-six." /* 34: 231 */
"including.the.last.null." /* 24: 255 */
"";
static const char toolong[] =
/* ..|....1.........2.........3.........4.........5.........6... */
/* 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 */
"here.is.a.hostname.which.is.only.barely.too.long." /* 49: 49 */
"to.be.encoded.as.a.QNAME.of.the.maximum.allowed.length."
/* 55: 104 */
"which.is.256.including.a.final.zero-length.label." /* 49: 153 */
"representing.the.root.node.so.that.a.name.with." /* 47: 200 */
"a.trailing.dot.may.have.up.to." /* 30: 230 */
"255.characters.never.more." /* 26: 256 */
"";
static const char emptylabel[] =
"this.is.an.otherwise-valid.hostname."
".with.an.empty.label.";
static const char outsizelabel[] =
"this.is.an.otherwise-valid.hostname."
"with-a-label-of-greater-length-than-the-sixty-three-characters-"
"specified.in.the.RFCs.";
size_t i;
struct test {
const char *name;
const DOHcode expected_result;
};
/* plays the role of struct dnsprobe in urldata.h */
struct demo {
unsigned char dohbuffer[255 + 16]; /* deliberately short buffer */
unsigned char canary1;
unsigned char canary2;
unsigned char canary3;
};
const struct test playlist[4] = {
{ toolong, DOH_DNS_NAME_TOO_LONG }, /* expect early failure */
{ emptylabel, DOH_DNS_BAD_LABEL }, /* also */
{ outsizelabel, DOH_DNS_BAD_LABEL }, /* also */
{ max, DOH_OK } /* expect buffer overwrite */
};
for(i = 0; i < CURL_ARRAYSIZE(playlist); i++) {
const char *name = playlist[i].name;
size_t olen = 100000;
struct demo victim;
DOHcode d;
victim.canary1 = 87; /* magic numbers, arbitrarily picked */
victim.canary2 = 35;
victim.canary3 = 41;
d = doh_req_encode(name, CURL_DNS_TYPE_A, victim.dohbuffer,
sizeof(struct demo), /* allow room for overflow */
&olen);
fail_unless(d == playlist[i].expected_result,
"result returned was not as expected");
if(d == playlist[i].expected_result) {
if(name == max) {
fail_if(victim.canary1 == 87,
"demo one-byte buffer overwrite did not happen");
}
else {
fail_unless(victim.canary1 == 87,
"one-byte buffer overwrite has happened");
}
fail_unless(victim.canary2 == 35,
"two-byte buffer overwrite has happened");
fail_unless(victim.canary3 == 41,
"three-byte buffer overwrite has happened");
}
else if(d == DOH_OK) {
fail_unless(olen <= sizeof(victim.dohbuffer),
"wrote outside bounds");
fail_unless(olen > strlen(name), "unrealistic low size");
}
}
} while(0);
/* run normal cases and try to trigger buffer length related errors */
do {
DNStype dnstype = CURL_DNS_TYPE_A;
unsigned char buffer[128];
const size_t buflen = sizeof(buffer);
const size_t magic1 = 9765;
size_t olen1 = magic1;
static const char *sunshine1 = "a.com";
static const char *dotshine1 = "a.com.";
static const char *sunshine2 = "aa.com";
size_t olen2;
DOHcode ret2;
size_t olen;
DOHcode ret = doh_req_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen1);
fail_unless(ret == DOH_OK, "sunshine case 1 should pass fine");
fail_if(olen1 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
fail_unless(olen1 > strlen(sunshine1), "bad out length");
/* with a trailing dot, the response should have the same length */
olen2 = magic1;
ret2 = doh_req_encode(dotshine1, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen2);
fail_unless(ret2 == DOH_OK, "dotshine case should pass fine");
fail_if(olen2 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
fail_unless(olen1 == olen2, "olen should not grow for a trailing dot");
/* add one letter, the response should be one longer */
olen2 = magic1;
ret2 = doh_req_encode(sunshine2, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen2);
fail_unless(ret2 == DOH_OK, "sunshine case 2 should pass fine");
fail_if(olen2 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
fail_unless(olen1 + 1 == olen2, "olen should grow with the hostname");
/* pass a short buffer, should fail */
ret = doh_req_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, olen1 - 1, &olen);
fail_if(ret == DOH_OK, "short buffer should have been noticed");
/* pass a minimum buffer, should succeed */
ret = doh_req_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, olen1, &olen);
fail_unless(ret == DOH_OK, "minimal length buffer should be long enough");
fail_unless(olen == olen1, "bad buffer length");
} while(0);
#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_DOH */
UNITTEST_END_SIMPLE
}