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Alexander J. Semenuk 5d5e35fb9b fix: Windows toolchain compatibility (curl 8.21 re-vendor, endless reconfigure loop) (#4355 )

## Problem

Windows builds break with a current local toolchain (Scoop LLVM 22.1.8,
CMake 4.4.0, VS 2026), in two independent ways:

1. The build stops at curl's deliberate guard: `#error "no non-blocking
method was found/used/set"` in `third-party/curl/lib/nonblock.c`.
2. From the second configure onward, `cmake --build` re-runs CMake in an
endless loop (observed 42 consecutive reconfigure cycles in a single
build). Likely the same mechanism behind the "endlessly building" VS
2026 note in `docs/setup/dev/vs.md`.

## Root cause

1. `third-party/curl/CMake/CurlTests.c` passes `int *` to
`ioctlsocket()`, whose third parameter is `u_long *`. Clang 22 promotes
`-Wincompatible-pointer-types` to a hard error in C, so the
`HAVE_IOCTLSOCKET_FIONBIO` try_compile silently fails and
`curl_config.h` never defines it. Upstream CI does not see this because
the windows-2022 runner image ships an older LLVM. GCC 14 promotes the
same warning to a hard error, which is very likely the `CurlTests.c.obj`
failure reported from MSYS2 in open-goal/jak-project#3551. Upstream curl
hit the identical problem with GCC 14 and fixed the probe in curl 8.8.0
(curl/curl#13578).
2. The root CMakeLists copies the build tree's `compile_commands.json`
into `<src>/build/` for clangd using `configure_file()`, which registers
its input as a configure dependency. CMake rewrites
`compile_commands.json` late in every generation, after
`CTestTestfile.cmake` and `cmake_install.cmake` (outputs of the same
Ninja regen rule), so once the dependency is registered the rule is
deterministically dirty and every `ninja` invocation re-runs CMake. A
pristine first configure is safe (the file does not exist yet, so the
`if(EXISTS ...)` guard skips the copy), which is why the loop looks
machine- or IDE-specific.

## Fix

1. Per review, re-vendor `third-party/curl` at the `curl-8_21_0` tag
(previously `curl-8_3_0`), which carries the upstream probe fix plus two
years of upstream development; `vendor.yaml` updated to match.
Adjustments the version jump forced:
- curl 8.15 removed the native macOS Secure Transport backend
(`CURL_USE_SECTRANSP`), so macOS now builds curl against OpenSSL like
Linux. The two macOS workflows install Homebrew `openssl@3` and export
`OPENSSL_ROOT_DIR` (keg-only), and the macOS setup docs gained the same
two lines.
- `CURL_BROTLI` / `CURL_ZSTD` switched to AUTO-detection in curl 8.10;
pinned OFF to keep the previous no-compression behavior and avoid
silently linking whatever the CI images happen to have.
- curl's new top-level `BUILD_EXAMPLES` cache option (default ON) leaked
into discord-rpc's identically named option and broke configure at a
nonexistent `examples/send-presence` directory; pinned OFF ahead of the
third-party subdirectories.

The diff is dominated by the mechanical tag-tree swap under
`third-party/curl` (linguist-vendored, collapsed in review). The
hand-written changes are `CMakeLists.txt`, the two macOS workflows,
`docs/setup/system/macos.md`, and `vendor.yaml`.
2. Swap `configure_file()` for `file(COPY ...)`: the same clangd copy
with no configure dependency registered. (`file(COPY_FILE ...
ONLY_IF_DIFFERENT)` would be cleaner still but requires CMake 3.21,
above the declared `cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.10)`.)

## Test plan

- [x] Fresh `cmake --preset Release-windows-clang` (LLVM 22, no cache
seeding) completes and logs `Enabled SSL backends: Schannel`; the
FIONBIO probe passes without the previous `#error`
- [x] Full Windows Release build from scratch in the branch worktree
(all 1422 targets)
- [x] goalc-test suite: 1509 passed, 0 failed
- [x] Second consecutive configure with `compile_commands.json` present:
the regen rule in `build.ninja` has no `compile_commands.json` input;
`<src>/build/compile_commands.json` is still refreshed for clangd
- [x] Repeated `ninja` invocations after a full build no longer re-run
CMake
- [x] macOS Intel and ARM CI green (first exercise of the OpenSSL
backend switch)

---

I work off a self-hosted forge, so this GitHub account is quiet; the
configure logs and ninja dirty-node traces from the investigation are
available if anyone wants the raw data.

(AI-assisted)

2026-07-27 19:19:18 -04:00

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Verify

Do not trust, verify!

Signed releases

Every curl release is shipped as a set of tarballs. They all have the exact same content but use different archivers, visible by the different file extensions used.

Each tarball is signed by the curl release manager Daniel. The digital signatures for each tarball are always provided. The digital signatures can be used to verify that the tarballs were produced by Daniel.

If the curl website were breached and fake curl releases were provided, they could be detected using these signatures.

Daniel's public GPG key: 27ED EAF2 2F3A BCEB 50DB 9A12 5CC9 08FD B71E 12C2

Reproducible releases

The curl project ships reproducible releases. This means that everyone is able - and encouraged - to independently verify the contents of every curl release. Verify that it contains exactly the bits that are supposed to be in the release and nothing extra.

The curl releases are generated using a Docker image to make it easy to get an identical setup. To verify an existing curl release, we provide a convenient script that generates a new curl release from source code and then compares this newly generated release tarball with the tarball file you downloaded from curl.se.

For full verification, invoke the script inside an up-to-date curl source code git repository. Without a git repository present, it does a lighter check by rebuilding the release using the files in the tarball.

Note: full verification mode checks out the release tag in your repository. Run it in a clean working tree (no local changes) or a dedicated clone.

Invoke it like this:

git clone https://github.com/curl/curl
cd curl
mv [download-dir]/curl-8.19.0.tar.xz .
./scripts/verify-release curl-8.19.0.tar.xz

A successful check ends up with a final output similar to:

curl-8.19.0.tar.xz: OK

By verifying the release tarballs, you verify that Daniel does not infect the release on purpose or involuntarily because of anything malicious running in his setup.

Verify the verify

Of course you should not blindly trust the verification script. It is short and simple and should be quick to verify. Or you write your own script that you trust, to do the same job.

Source code

How do you then verify that what is in git is fine to build a product from?

In the curl project we verify the source code in multiple ways, and one way to gain trust is to verify and review our testing procedures.

we have a consistent code style (invalid style causes errors)
we ban and avoid a number of "sensitive" and "hard-to-use" C functions (use of such functions causes errors)
we have a ceiling for complexity in functions to keep them easy to follow, read and understand (failing to do so causes errors)
we review all pull requests before merging, both with humans and with bots. We link back commits to their origin pull requests in commit messages.
we ban use of "binary blobs" in git to not provide means for malicious actors to bundle encrypted payloads (trying to include a blob causes errors)
every single file in the git repository has a clear copyright and license statement. Complete knowledge and tracking of provenience.
we actively avoid base64 encoded chunks as they too could function as ways to obfuscate malicious contents
we forbid and prevent git force push on the master branch. History cannot be rewritten.
we ban most uses of UTF-8 in code and documentation to avoid easily mixed up Unicode characters that look like other characters. (adding Unicode characters causes errors)
we document everything to make it clear how things are supposed to work. No surprises. Lots of documentation is tested and verified in addition to spellchecks and consistent wording.
we have thousands of tests and we add test cases for (ideally) every functionality. Finding "white spots" and adding coverage is a top priority. curl runs on countless operating systems, CPU architectures and you can build curl in billions of different configuration setups: not every combination is practically possible to test
we build curl and run tests in over two hundred CI jobs that are run for every commit and every PR. We do not merge commits that have unexplained test failures.
we run all tests as "torture tests", where each test case is rerun to have every invoked fallible function call fail once each, to make sure curl never leaks memory or crashes due to this.
we build curl in CI with the most picky compiler options enabled and we never allow compiler warnings to linger. We always use -Werror that converts warnings to errors and fail the builds.
we run all tests using valgrind and several combinations of sanitizers to find and reduce the risk for memory problems, undefined behavior and similar
we keep running static code analyzers on the code, both traditional ones (clang-tidy, CodeSonar, Coverity) but also new generation AI powered ones like Zeropath and Codex Security.
we run fuzzing on curl: non-stop as part of Google's OSS-Fuzz project, but also briefly as part of the CI setup for every commit and PR
we make sure that the CI jobs we have for curl never "write back" to curl. They access the source repository read-only and even if they would be breached, they cannot infect or taint source code.
we run zizmor and other code analyzer tools on the CI job config scripts to reduce the risk of us running or using insecure CI jobs.
we do reproducible releases to allow anyone to verify that the contents is untainted
we digitally sign releases, git tags and git commits
there is a git backup on codeberg for enhanced resilience to infrastructure disturbance
we are committed to always fix reported vulnerabilities in the following release. Security problems never linger around once they have been reported.
we document everything and every detail about all curl vulnerabilities ever reported
our code has been audited several times by external security experts, and the few issues that have been detected in those were immediately addressed
Strong two-factor authentication on GitHub is mandatory for all committers
our commitment to never breaking ABI or API allows all users to easily upgrade to new releases. This enables users to run recent security-fixed versions instead of legacy insecure versions.
we have a vulnerability disclosure program that allows researchers to submit suspected vulnerabilities in a private and secure fashion, so that we can work on fixing curl and announcing the flaw in a responsible manner to minimize risks for users.

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