If FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP is disabled, kernel will continue to run with the same AMR
value with which it was entered. Hence there is a high chance that
we can return without restoring the AMR value. This also helps the case
when applications are not using the pkey feature. In this case, different
applications will have the same AMR values and hence we can avoid restoring
AMR in this case too.
Also avoid isync() if not really needed.
Do the same for IAMR.
null-syscall benchmark results:
With smap/smep disabled:
Without patch:
957.95 ns 2778.17 cycles
With patch:
858.38 ns 2489.30 cycles
With smap/smep enabled:
Without patch:
1017.26 ns 2950.36 cycles
With patch:
1021.51 ns 2962.44 cycles
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-23-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
With hash translation use DSISR_KEYFAULT to identify a wrong access.
With Radix we look at the AMR value and type of fault.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-17-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
If an application has configured address protection such that read/write is
denied using pkey even the kernel should receive a FAULT on accessing the same.
This patch use user AMR value stored in pt_regs.amr to achieve the same.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-16-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Now that kernel correctly store/restore userspace AMR/IAMR values, avoid
manipulating AMR and IAMR from the kernel on behalf of userspace.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-15-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
On fork, we inherit from the parent and on exec, we should switch to default_amr values.
Also, avoid changing the AMR register value within the kernel. The kernel now runs with
different AMR values.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-13-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
This prepare kernel to operate with a different value than userspace AMR/IAMR.
For this, AMR/IAMR need to be saved and restored on entry and return from the
kernel.
With KUAP we modify kernel AMR when accessing user address from the kernel
via copy_to/from_user interfaces. We don't need to modify IAMR value in
similar fashion.
If MMU_FTR_PKEY is enabled we need to save AMR/IAMR in pt_regs on entering
kernel from userspace. If not we can assume that AMR/IAMR is not modified
from userspace.
We need to save AMR if we have MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP feature enabled and we are
interrupted within kernel. This is required so that if we get interrupted
within copy_to/from_user we continue with the right AMR value.
If we hae MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP enabled we need to restore IAMR on
return to userspace beause kernel will be running with a different
IAMR value.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-11-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
In later patches during exec, we would like to access default regs.amr to
control access to the user mapping. Having thread.regs set early makes the
code changes simpler.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-10-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
This patch updates kernel hash page table entries to use storage key 3
for its mapping. This implies all kernel access will now use key 3 to
control READ/WRITE. The patch also prevents the allocation of key 3 from
userspace and UAMOR value is updated such that userspace cannot modify key 3.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-9-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
This is in preparation to adding support for kuap with hash translation.
In preparation for that rename/move kuap related functions to
non radix names. Also move the feature bit closer to MMU_FTR_KUEP.
MMU_FTR_KUEP is renamed to MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP to indicate the feature
is only relevant to BOOK3S_64
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-8-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
The next set of patches adds support for kuep with hash translation.
In preparation for that rename/move kuap related functions to
non radix names.
Also set MMU_FTR_KUEP and add the missing isync().
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-7-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
The next set of patches adds support for kuap with hash translation.
In preparation for that rename/move kuap related functions to
non radix names.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-6-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
The config CONFIG_PPC_PKEY is used to select the base support that is
required for PPC_MEM_KEYS, KUAP, and KUEP. Adding this dependency
reduces the code complexity(in terms of #ifdefs) and enables us to
move some of the initialization code to pkeys.c
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-4-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Don't treat ERAT MCEs as SLB, don't save the SLB and use a specific
ERAT flush to recover it.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128070728.825934-7-npiggin@gmail.com
The driver core ignores the return value of struct device_driver::remove
because there is only little that can be done. For the shutdown callback
it's ps3_system_bus_shutdown() which ignores the return value.
To simplify the quest to make struct device_driver::remove return void,
let struct ps3_system_bus_driver::remove return void, too. All users
already unconditionally return 0, this commit makes it obvious that
returning an error code is a bad idea and ensures future users behave
accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126165950.2554997-2-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
Introduce a static branch that would be set during boot if the OS
happens to be a KVM guest. Subsequent checks to see if we are on KVM
will rely on this static branch. This static branch would be used in
vcpu_is_preempted() in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202050456.164005-4-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
We want to reuse the is_kvm_guest() name in a subsequent patch but
with a new body. Hence rename is_kvm_guest() to check_kvm_guest(). No
additional changes.
Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # int -> bool fix
[mpe: Fold in fix from lkp to use true/false not 0/1]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202050456.164005-3-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Only code/declaration movement, in anticipation of doing a KVM-aware
vcpu_is_preempted(). No additional changes.
Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202050456.164005-2-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
This enables GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS on Power so that 32-bit
offsets are stored in the bug entries rather than 64-bit pointers.
While this doesn't save space for 32-bit machines, use it anyway so
there is only one code path.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201201005203.15210-1-jniethe5@gmail.com
This is copied from arm64.
Instead of using runtime generated signal trampoline offsets,
get offsets at buildtime.
If the said trampoline doesn't exist, build will fail. So no
need to check whether the trampoline exists or not in the VDSO.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f8bfd6812c3e3678b1cdb4d55a52f9eb022b40d3.1601197618.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
All other architectures but s390 use a void pointer named 'vdso'
to reference the VDSO mapping.
In a following patch, the VDSO data page will be put in front of
text, vdso_base will then not anymore point to VDSO text.
To avoid confusion between vdso_base and VDSO text, rename vdso_base
into vdso and make it a void __user *.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8e6cefe474aa4ceba028abb729485cd46c140990.1601197618.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Today vdso_data structure has:
- syscall_map_32[] and syscall_map_64[] on PPC64
- syscall_map_32[] on PPC32
On PPC32, syscall_map_32[] is populated using sys_call_table[].
On PPC64, syscall_map_64[] is populated using sys_call_table[]
and syscal_map_32[] is populated using compat_sys_call_table[].
To simplify vdso_setup_syscall_map(),
- On PPC32 rename syscall_map_32[] into syscall_map[],
- On PPC64 rename syscall_map_64[] into syscall_map[],
- On PPC64 rename syscall_map_32[] into compat_syscall_map[].
That way, syscall_map[] gets populated using sys_call_table[] and
compat_syscall_map[] gets population using compat_sys_call_table[].
Also define an empty compat_syscall_map[] on PPC32 to avoid ifdefs.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/472734be0d9991eee320a06824219a5b2663736b.1601197618.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
get_clean_sp() is only used once in kernel/signal.c .
GCC is smart enough to see that x & 0xffffffff is a nop
calculation on PPC32, no need of a special PPC32 trivial version.
Include the logic from the PPC64 version of get_clean_sp() directly
in get_sigframe().
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/13ef6510ce30a4867e043157b93af5bb8c67fb3b.1597770847.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
There is no point in copying floating point regs when there
is no FPU and MATH_EMULATION is not selected.
Create a new CONFIG_PPC_FPU_REGS bool that is selected by
CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION and CONFIG_PPC_FPU, and use it to
opt out everything related to fp_state in thread_struct.
The asm const used only by fpu.S are opted out with CONFIG_PPC_FPU
as fpu.S build is conditionnal to CONFIG_PPC_FPU.
The following app spends approx 8.1 seconds system time on an 8xx
without the patch, and 7.0 seconds with the patch (13.5% reduction).
On an 832x, it spends approx 2.6 seconds system time without
the patch and 2.1 seconds with the patch (19% reduction).
void sigusr1(int sig) { }
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i = 100000;
signal(SIGUSR1, sigusr1);
for (;i--;)
raise(SIGUSR1);
exit(0);
}
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7569070083e6cd5b279bb5023da601aba3c06f3c.1597770847.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Provides __kernel_clock_gettime64() on vdso32. This is the
64 bits version of __kernel_clock_gettime() which is
y2038 compliant.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-9-mpe@ellerman.id.au
On PPC64, the TOC pointer needs to be saved and restored.
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-7-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation in following
patch. Here, we:
- Prepare the helpers to call the C VDSO functions
- Prepare the required callbacks for the C VDSO functions
- Prepare the clocksource.h files to define VDSO_ARCH_CLOCKMODES
- Add the C trampolines to the generic C VDSO functions
powerpc is a bit special for VDSO as well as system calls in the
way that it requires setting CR SO bit which cannot be done in C.
Therefore, entry/exit needs to be performed in ASM.
Implementing __arch_get_vdso_data() would clobber the link register,
requiring the caller to save it. As the ASM calling function already
has to set a stack frame and saves the link register before calling
the C vdso function, retriving the vdso data pointer there is lighter.
Implement __arch_vdso_capable() and always return true.
Provide vdso_shift_ns(), as the generic x >> s gives the following
bad result:
18: 35 25 ff e0 addic. r9,r5,-32
1c: 41 80 00 10 blt 2c <shift+0x14>
20: 7c 64 4c 30 srw r4,r3,r9
24: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0
...
2c: 54 69 08 3c rlwinm r9,r3,1,0,30
30: 21 45 00 1f subfic r10,r5,31
34: 7c 84 2c 30 srw r4,r4,r5
38: 7d 29 50 30 slw r9,r9,r10
3c: 7c 63 2c 30 srw r3,r3,r5
40: 7d 24 23 78 or r4,r9,r4
In our case the shift is always <= 32. In addition, the upper 32 bits
of the result are likely nul. Lets GCC know it, it also optimises the
following calculations.
With the patch, we get:
0: 21 25 00 20 subfic r9,r5,32
4: 7c 69 48 30 slw r9,r3,r9
8: 7c 84 2c 30 srw r4,r4,r5
c: 7d 24 23 78 or r4,r9,r4
10: 7c 63 2c 30 srw r3,r3,r5
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-6-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Currently we use ifdef __powerpc64__ in barrier.h to decide if we
should use lwsync or eieio for SMPWMB which is then used by
__smp_wmb().
That means when we are building the compat VDSO we will use eieio,
because it's 32-bit code, even though we're building a 64-bit kernel
for a 64-bit CPU.
Although eieio should work, it would be cleaner if we always used the
same barrier, even for the 32-bit VDSO.
So change the ifdef to CONFIG_PPC64, so that the selection is made
based on the bitness of the kernel we're building for, not the current
compilation unit.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-5-mpe@ellerman.id.au
When we're building the compat VDSO we are building 32-bit code but in
the context of a 64-bit kernel configuration.
To make this work we need to be careful in some places when using
ifdefs to differentiate between CONFIG_PPC64 and __powerpc64__.
CONFIG_PPC64 indicates the kernel we're building is 64-bit, but it
doesn't tell us that we're currently building 64-bit code - we could
be building 32-bit code for the compat VDSO.
On the other hand __powerpc64__ tells us that we are currently
building 64-bit code (and therefore we must also be building a 64-bit
kernel).
In the case of get_tb() we want to use the 32-bit code sequence
regardless of whether the kernel we're building for is 64-bit or
32-bit, what matters is the word size of the current object. So we
need to check __powerpc64__ to decide if we use mftb() or the
mftbu()/mftb() sequence.
For mftb() the logic for CPU_FTR_CELL_TB_BUG only makes sense if we're
building 64-bit code, so guard that with a __powerpc64__ check.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-4-mpe@ellerman.id.au
In order to easily use get_tb() from C VDSO, move timebase
functions into a new header named asm/vdso/timebase.h
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-3-mpe@ellerman.id.au
cpu_relax() need to be in asm/vdso/processor.h to be used by
the C VDSO generic library.
Move it there.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
In order to build VDSO32 for PPC64, we need to have CPU_FTRS_POSSIBLE
and CPU_FTRS_ALWAYS independant of whether we are building the
32 bits VDSO or the 64 bits VDSO.
Use #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 instead of #ifdef __powerpc64__
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126131006.2431205-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
The clang toolchain treats inline assembly a bit differently than
straight assembly code. In particular, inline assembly doesn't have
the complete context available to resolve expressions. This is
intentional to avoid divergence in the resulting assembly code.
We can work around this issue by borrowing a workaround done for ARM,
i.e. not directly testing the labels themselves, but by moving the
current output pointer by a value that should always be zero. If this
value is not null, then we will trigger a backward move, which is
explicitly forbidden.
Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
[mpe: Put it in a macro and only do the workaround for clang]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120224034.191382-4-morbo@google.com
Using DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE needs linux/jump_table.h.
Otherwise the build fails with eg:
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:66:1: warning: data definition has no type or storage class
66 | DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);
Fixes: 9a32a7e78b ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
[mpe: Massage change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123184016.693fe464@canb.auug.org.au
From Daniel's cover letter:
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern.
This patch series flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry (patch 2) and after the
kernel performs any user accesses (patch 3). It also adds a self-test and
performs some related cleanups.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-cve-2020-4788' into fixes
From Daniel's cover letter:
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern.
This patch series flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry (patch 2) and after the
kernel performs any user accesses (patch 3). It also adds a self-test and
performs some related cleanups.