Using pm_runtime_resume_and_get() to replace pm_runtime_get_sync and
pm_runtime_put_noidle. This change is just to simplify the code, no
actual functional changes.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: ran jianping <ran.jianping@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jaswinder.singh@linaro.org>
Using pm_runtime_resume_and_get() to replace pm_runtime_get_sync and
pm_runtime_put_noidle. This change is just to simplify the code, no
actual functional changes.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: ran jianping <ran.jianping@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jaswinder.singh@linaro.org>
Tegra234 supports sending/receiving 32-bit and 128-bit data over
a shared mailbox. Based on the data size to be used, clients need
to specify the type of shared mailbox in the device tree.
Add a macro for 128-bit shared mailbox. Mailbox clients can use this
macro as a flag in device tree to enable 128-bit data support for a
shared mailbox.
Signed-off-by: Kartik <kkartik@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jaswinder.singh@linaro.org>
The list iterator is always non-NULL so it doesn't need to be checked.
Thus just remove the unnecessary NULL check.
Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong <xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jaswinder.singh@linaro.org>
Smatch reports this issue
imx-mailbox.c:887:10: warning: Initializer entry defined twice
imx-mailbox.c:889:10: also defined here
.rxdb = imx_mu_generic_rxdb,
Is listed twice, so remove one.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jaswinder.singh@linaro.org>
Consumer examples in the bindings of resource providers are trivial,
useless and duplicating code. Additionally the incomplete qcom,smp2p
example triggers DT schema warnings.
Cleanup the example by removing the consumer part and fixing the
indentation to DT schema convention.
Reported-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <jaswinder.singh@linaro.org>
Commit 6eaf08770e ("ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Warn about sleeps
greater than 10 ms") made acpi_ex_system_do_sleep() log a warning for
sleep times greater than 10 ms, but such sleep times are used in
power management AML because of the PCI specification requirements.
This results with logging warnings that cannot really be acted on in
any useful way which is annoying and these warnings show up in the logs
on many production systems, so revert commit 6eaf08770e.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Rather than pass in a bool for whether or not this work item needs to go
into the priority list or not, provide separate helpers for it. For most
use cases, this also then gets rid of the branch for non-priority task
work.
While at it, rename the prior_task_list to prio_task_list. Prior is
a confusing name for it, as it would seem to indicate that this is the
previous task_work list. prio makes it clear that this is a priority
task_work list.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Due to i2c->adap.dev.fwnode not being set, ACPI_COMPANION() wasn't properly
found for TWSI controllers.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Balcerak <sbalcerak@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Piyush Malgujar <pmalgujar@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Spelling mistake (triple letters) in comment.
Detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
i2c-rcar already has priv->flags. This patch adds a new persistent flag
ID_P_NOT_ATOMIC and uses it to save the extra variable. The negation of
the logic was done to make the code more readable.
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
[wsa: negated the logic, rebased, updated the commit message]
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Previous refactoring makes it easy now to convert the above flag to a
non-persistent one. This is more appropriate and easier to maintain.
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Before sending a MSI the hardware writes information pertinent to the
interrupt cause to a memory location pointed by SMTICL register. This
memory holds three double words where the least significant bit tells
whether the interrupt cause of master/target/error is valid. The driver
does not use this but we need to set it up because otherwise it will
perform DMA write to the default address (0) and this will cause an
IOMMU fault such as below:
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 2
DMAR: [DMA Write] Request device [00:12.0] PASID ffffffff fault addr 0
[fault reason 05] PTE Write access is not set
To prevent this from happening, provide a proper DMA buffer for this
that then gets mapped by the IOMMU accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale
Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data.
Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update.
As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation
infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS
mitigation.
Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation
status can be checked from below file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by
MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot
be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS
mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to
extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.
Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by
Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
We know that "ret" is a negative error code at this point so there is
no need to check.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
When the CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities,
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) can propagate stale data out
of Fill buffer to uncore buffer when CPU goes idle. Stale data can then
be exploited with other variants using MMIO operations.
Mitigate it by clearing the Fill buffer before entering idle state.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
MDS, TAA and Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations rely on clearing CPU
buffers. Moreover, status of these mitigations affects each other.
During boot, it is important to maintain the order in which these
mitigations are selected. This is especially true for
md_clear_update_mitigation() that needs to be called after MDS, TAA and
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation selection is done.
Introduce md_clear_select_mitigation(), and select all these mitigations
from there. This reflects relationships between these mitigations and
ensures proper ordering.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst.
These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as:
Device Register Partial Write (DRPW):
Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are
smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only
copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte
write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be
written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale
data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write
transaction.
Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS):
After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied
stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS
can leak data from the fill buffer.
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR):
It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the
data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state.
An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill
buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill
buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a
guest.
On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data
from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can
still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with
VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable
guests.
Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control
the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation uses similar mitigation as MDS and
TAA. In preparation for adding its mitigation, add a common function to
update all mitigations that depend on MD_CLEAR.
[ bp: Add a newline in md_clear_update_mitigation() to separate
statements better. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Add the admin guide for Processor MMIO stale data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Use devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource() to simplify
code.
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Fix the missing clk_disable_unprepare() before return
from mtk_i2c_probe() in the error handling case.
Fixes: d04913ec5f ("i2c: mt7621: Add MediaTek MT7621/7628/7688 I2C driver")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Executing reboot command several times on the machine "Dell
PowerEdge R740", UEFI security detection stopped machine
with the following prompt:
UEFI0082: The system was reset due to a timeout from the watchdog
timer. Check the System Event Log (SEL) or crash dumps from
Operating Sysstem to identify the source that triggered the
watchdog timer reset. Update the firmware or driver for the
identified device.
iDRAC has warning event: "The watchdog timer reset the system".
This patch fixes this issue by adding the reboot notifier.
Signed-off-by: Liu Xinpeng <liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650984810-6247-3-git-send-email-liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org>
This ensures that the same value is read back as was eventually
programmed when using seconds as accuracy. Even then, comparing the more
precise heartbeat_ms against heartbeat in seconds will almost never
provide a match and will needlessly raise a warning. Fix by comparing
apples to apples.
Tested in combination with U-Boot as watchdog starter.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6a4b54ac-9588-e172-c4c7-b91d524a851e@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org>
